



















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3203 








An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 










This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where firms post wage/tenure contracts 
and risk-averse workers, both employed and unemployed, search for better paid job 
opportunities. Different firms typically offer different contracts. Workers accumulate general 
human capital through learning-by-doing. With on-the-job search, a worker’s wage evolves 
endogenously over time through experience effects, tenure effects and quits to better paid 
employment. This equilibrium approach suggests how to identify econometrically between 
experience and tenure effects on worker wages. 
JEL-Code: J41. 








Department of Economics 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Melvyn Coles 
Department of Economics 





October, 2010 1 Introduction
Here we investigate individual wage dynamics in the context of an equilibrium labour
market framework where workers accumulate human capital while working, ￿rms post
contracts, and workers search while employed. The analysis leads to new insights into
two important areas in labour economics - the nature of equilibrium in search markets,
and the empirical decomposition of wages into experience and tenure e⁄ects.
There is a signi￿cant empirical literature which has attempted to decompose wages
into experience and tenure e⁄ects (see, for example, Altonji and Shakotko (1987),
Topel (1991), Altonji and Williams (2005), and Dustmann and Meghir (2005) ). The
results obtained are still hotly debated. There are two major di¢ culties faced by
researchers in this area. First, tenure and experience are perfectly correlated within
any employment spell. Second, it is unreasonable to assume a quit (which resets
tenure to zero) is an exogenous outcome which is orthogonal to the wages paid by
the previous employer and the new one. Without an equilibrium framework it seems
an heroic task identifying between tenure and experience wage e⁄ects. A major
objective of this study is to provide a coherent framework which identi￿es between
these two factors.
The typical theoretical justi￿cation presented to explain why wages change both
with experience and with tenure is based on two big ideas associated with Rosen
(1972) and Mincer (1974). First, although there is no free lunch, it is accepted
by many that individuals accumulate human capital by working. Typists become
better typists while working as typists, economists become more productive by doing
economics, etc. This seems both an important and intuitive idea. A related idea
now common among labour economists, is that human capital can be dichotomized
into general human capital and ￿rm speci￿c human capital. A worker who enjoys
an increase in general human capital becomes more productive at all jobs, whereas
accumulating ￿rm speci￿c human capital implies a worker is only more productive at
that ￿rm. Workers who change job, or those who are laid o⁄, lose their ￿rm speci￿c
human capital but keep their general human capital. Putting these two ideas together,
plus assuming a worker￿ s wage is an increasing function of both his/her general and
1speci￿c human capital, leads to at least the rudiments of a theory of how a worker￿ s
wage can depend on both experience and tenure.
The central di¢ culty with using this simple theory in applied work is that when
the market is competitive, ￿rm speci￿c capital has no impact on wages and so, in the
absence of any frictions, there should be no tenure e⁄ect on wages. Conversely when
markets are frictional, job search yields non-trivial wage dynamics. Indeed even when
there is no human capital accumulation, Burdett (1978) demonstrated some time ago
that through on-the-job search, quit turnover alone could explain why the average
wage of workers is a concave, increasing function of worker experience.
In the present study we describe a labour market with frictions where workers
accumulate general human capital through learning-by-doing and there are also (en-
dogenous) tenure e⁄ects. It yields a description of cross section wage dispersion which
is consistent with the distribution of wage/age pro￿les across individual workers. The
framework is particularly rich as:
(i) workers are ex-ante heterogeneous - workers have di⁄erent productivities when
￿rst entering the labour market;
(ii) randomness in the job search process implies even workers of the same age may
have very di⁄erent work experience and thus have accumulated di⁄erent levels of
human capital;
(iii) there is dispersion in wage contracts o⁄ered by ￿rms so that starting wages and
tenure e⁄ects vary systematically across ￿rms;
(iv) there is sorting with age, where on-the-job search implies older workers have, on
average, better paid employment.
Even allowing for such richness, the model yields a relatively straightforward
econometric structure. We discuss this structure in detail in Section 6 below. An
important observation, however, is that the wage tenure e⁄ect at any given ￿rm
depends on its starting wage o⁄er: the greater a ￿rm￿ s initial wage o⁄er, the smaller
the wage-tenure e⁄ect. Indeed a ￿rm whose payrates are close to the highest in the
market will have very small tenure e⁄ects. This structure also predicts that younger
workers (who on average tend to be less well paid) enjoy greater wage increases with
2tenure than do older workers.
The paper builds on the seminal work of Burdett (1978) and Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) which show how equilibrium search can generate wage dispersion and individ-
ual wage pro￿les that are (on average) increasing and concave in experience. Stevens
(2004) subsequently demonstrated why, in that framework, ￿rms increase pro￿t by
o⁄ering contracts which increase the wage paid with tenure (or seniority). Essentially
paying higher wages at longer tenures rewards worker loyalty. This is pro￿table to the
￿rm as rewarding loyalty reduces a worker￿ s quit incentive and the ￿rm can then pay
lower wages at short tenures to better extract the search rents of new hires. With risk
neutral workers, Stevens (2004) showed the optimal tenure contract is a step contract,
say the ￿rm pays some base wage until the worker reaches some promotion tenure T;
after which the worker is paid marginal product. Burdett and Coles (2003) showed
with strictly risk averse workers, the optimal contract smooths wage payments by
tenure. It then described a search equilibrium where di⁄erent ￿rms post di⁄erent
optimal contracts and workers used optimal search strategies.1
Several papers have considered general human capital accumulation within the
Burdett/Mortensen framework (see for example Bunzel et. al. (2000), Barlevy
(2005), Burdett et al (2010)). The addition of learning-by-doing generates interest-
ing sorting e⁄ects: higher wage ￿rms not only attract and retain more workers, but
also, in steady state, enjoy a more experienced and thus more productive workforce.
The introduction of learning-by-doing also signi￿cantly increases equilibrium wage
inequality: young workers not only have little work experience, the reservation wage
(or piece rate) of the unemployed is low as experience is valuable and an employee
will accept a low paid job as an investment in increased (future) productivity.
A complementary approach to the one taken here assumes instead ￿rms compete
on wages when an employee receives an outside o⁄er (see for example Postel Vinay
and Robin (2002a,b)). This approach yields an important econometric structure for
applied work on wages and turnover. With competitive bidding by ￿rms, turnover
becomes very simple: a worker quits whenever he/she contacts a higher productivity
1More recently Shi (2009) has applied this contracting approach to the directed search framework.
3￿rm. Observed wages are then a convolution of each ￿rm￿ s bid function and the dis-
tribution of ￿rm productivities: the wage paid to any given employee simply matches
the value of that employee￿ s best previous o⁄er. Yamaguchi (2006), and Bagger et al.
(2010) also extend that framework to human capital accumulation while employed.
Of course it is an empirical question whether ￿rms match o⁄ers or not (though
see Postel Vinay and Robin (2004) and Holzner (2010) who ask when this policy may,
or may not be, privately optimal for ￿rms). Clearly, in some labor markets ￿rms do
respond to outside o⁄ers (as in the academic labor market), whereas in others (as in
the labor market for bricklayers) ￿rms do not respond. The empirical implications of
these two approaches are di⁄erent. For example Burdett and Coles (2010) show that
turnover is not e¢ cient when ￿rms post tenure contracts: well paid senior workers may
reject job o⁄ers at more productive ￿rms whose starting salaries are too low. Also the
quit behaviour of workers is di⁄erent. Here within any employment spell, a worker￿ s
quit rate decreases with tenure; i.e. at any given ￿rm, there is negative duration
dependence in its employees￿job-to-job hazard rate. Conversely in a matching o⁄ers
framework, a worker quits as soon as he/she contacts a higher productivity ￿rm. In
that case at any given ￿rm, there is no duration dependence in its employees￿job-to-
job hazard rate. Finally the matching o⁄ers framework implies income is subject to
large shocks within an employment spell: a worker may enjoy a substantial payrise
by generating an outside o⁄er. Conversely the framework here implies wages within
an employment spell increase incrementally (through an internal promotion scheme).
The next Section speci￿es the basic framework. Section 3 characterises the set
of optimal contracts o⁄ered by ￿rms and section 4 de￿nes a market equilibrium and
describes its steady state properties. Section 5 proves the existence of a Market
Equilibrium. Section 6 describes the empirical implications of this framework and
concludes.
42 THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
The object is to construct an equilibrium framework where the income received by
an employed worker may vary with total work experience as well as with tenure.
A worker￿ s wage changes with experience as the worker becomes more productive
through learning-by-doing. Further a worker￿ s wage can vary with tenure as a result
of the wage contract o⁄ered by a ￿rm.
Time is continuous with an in￿nite horizon and only steady-states are considered.
There is a continuum of both ￿rms and workers, each of measure one. All ￿rms are
equally productive and have a constant returns to scale technology. A worker￿ s life
in this market is described by an exponential distribution with parameter ￿ > 0:
Hence over any small time period dt > 0; any worker leaves the market for good
with probability ￿dt: The parameter ￿ also describes the in￿ ow of new labour market
entrants. Each new entrant is initally unemployed and, for the moment, we assume
each has the same initial productivity y0: Later we show that the results generalize
straightforwardly to the case that workers are ex-ante heterogenous.
Learning-by-doing implies a worker￿ s productivity increases while employed. Let
￿ > 0 denote this learning rate. Thus after x years of work experience, a worker￿ s
productivity is y = y0e￿x. We restrict our attention to ￿ < ￿ so that lifetime payo⁄s
are bounded. While unemployed there is no learning-by-doing but nor is there human
capital decay - an unemployed worker￿ s productivity y simply remains constant. A
worker with productivity y generates revenue ￿ ow y while employed and income by
while unemployed, where 0 < b < 1:
Following Stevens (2004), ￿rms o⁄er optimal wage contracts where, inter alia, the
wage paid depends on the employee￿ s tenure (or seniority) ￿.2 In general ￿rm j￿ s
employment contract is a function which pays each employee a wage w = wj(y;x;￿):
Clearly there is no loss in generality by focussing on piece-rate contracts ￿ = ￿j(y;x;￿)
with wage paid w = y￿j(y;x;￿): Further as y = y0e￿x; and experience x = x0 +
2See Stevens (2004) for a complete discussion on the structure of optimal contracts when workers
are risk neutral. Note that such a contract rules out matching-o⁄er behaviour as considered in
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a,b).
5￿ where x0 is the employee￿ s prior work experience, there is no loss in generality
by further restricting attention to piece-rate tenure contracts of the form ￿j(￿;x0).
In the absence of tenure e⁄ects and learning-by-doing, Carillo (2008) explores how
conditioning wages on prior experience x0 a⁄ects market outcomes in a frictional
labour market. Here we rule out such discrimination by supposing each ￿rm must
o⁄er the same contract to potential hires with the same productivity. Speci￿cally
￿rm j o⁄ers the same piece rate tenure contract ￿ = ￿j(￿) to each new hire. Thus
more experienced workers are hired at a higher starting wage w = y￿j(0) but the
contract is not otherwise allowed to discriminate by experience. We discuss further
the role of this assumption in the conclusion.
Workers are either unemployed or employed and all obtain new job o⁄ers at Pois-
son rate ￿; independent of their employment status. Given an employee receives an
outside contract o⁄er, say e ￿(￿); the worker compares the value of remaining at his/her
current ￿rm with contract ￿(:) with current tenure ￿; or switching to the new ￿rm
o⁄ering contract e ￿(￿) with zero tenure. Any job o⁄er received is assumed to be the
realization of a random draw from the distribution of all o⁄ers made by ￿rms. We
describe this in more detail below. There are job destruction shocks in that each
employed worker is displaced into unemployment according to a exponential random
variable with parameter ￿ > 0: As is standard, there is no recall of previously rejected
employment o⁄ers.
In the absence of job destruction shocks, workers would ￿nd their earnings always
increase over time. An optimal consumption strategy with liquidity constraints would
then imply workers consume current earnings ￿(￿)y: Job destruction shocks, however,
generate a precautionary savings motive. For tractability, however, we simplify by
assuming workers can neither borrow nor save; i.e. consumption equals earnings at
all points in time. We further assume a ￿ ow utility function with constant relative
risk aversion; i.e. u(w) = w1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) with ￿ ￿ 0:3
Firms and workers have a zero rate of time preference. Firms are also risk neutral
3as typically done, we assume the worker￿ s continuation payo⁄ is zero in the event of death. But
note that ￿ > 1 implies ￿ ow utility is negative and in that case we must also rule out suicide.
6and so the objective of each is to maximize steady state ￿ ow pro￿t. Each worker
chooses a search and quit strategy to maximize expected total lifetime utility where
the exit process implies each discounts the future at rate ￿: Unless otherwise stated,
proofs of all claims made below are presented in the technical Appendix.
Workers
Let V = V (y;￿j￿) denote the maximum expected lifetime utility of an employed
worker with current productivity y; tenure ￿ with piece rate contract ￿(￿): As a
contract which induces an employee to quit into unemployment is never optimal,4 an











U(y) ￿ V (y;￿j￿)]
+￿[E maxfV (y;￿j￿);V (y;0je ￿)g ￿ V (y;￿j￿)];
where V U(y) denotes the maximum expected lifetime utility to an unemployed worker
with productivity y: Note, the employee￿ s payo⁄varies through time as the worker￿ s
productivity increases through learning-by-doing (picked up by the @V=@y term)
and as the piece rate earned varies with tenure (picked up by the @V=@￿ term).
Also at rate ￿ the worker receives a (random) outside contract o⁄er e ￿ and quits if






U(y);V (y;0je ￿)g ￿ V
U(y)]:
As ￿rms pay piece rates then wages earned are always proportional to productivity
y: Further a CRRA utility function and the assumption that productivity grows at a
constant rate now imply these value functions are separable in productivity y; i.e. V
4Suppose an optimal contract implies the worker quits into unemployment at tenure T ￿ 0: Thus
at tenure T, the ￿rm￿ s continuation pro￿t is zero and the worker obtains V U: The same contract but
which instead o⁄ers piece rate ￿(t) = b for all tenures t ￿ T is strictly pro￿t increasing - on-the-job
learning implies the worker obtains an improved payo⁄no lower than V U at T and, by not quitting,
the ￿rm￿ s continuation payo⁄ is strictly positive (as b < 1). This latter contract then makes greater
expected pro￿t which contradicts optimality of the original contract.
7and V U take the form






where U(￿j￿) is termed the piece rate value of contract ￿ (at tenure ￿) and UU is
called the piece rate value of unemployment.5
Let U0 = U(0je ￿) denote the starting piece rate value of a representative contract
o⁄er e ￿. As search is random, let F(e U0) denote the fraction of ￿rms making a con-
tract o⁄er whose starting piece rate value is no greater than e U0: Substituting out
V (y;￿j￿) = y1￿￿U(￿j￿) and V U(y) = y1￿￿UU in the Bellman equations above now
yields the following equations for U(:j￿) and UU :




















This has an obvious but important implication. Independent of the worker￿ s current
productivity y, an unemployed worker will accept o⁄er U0 if and only if U0 ￿ UU: This
implies the expected duration of unemployment is the same for all workers. Further
a worker￿ s quit rate is also independent of productivity y: an employed worker with
current piece rate value U(￿j￿) will accept a job o⁄er e ￿ if and only if the latter￿ s
starting piece rate value U(0je ￿) > U(￿j￿):
The above yields a complete description of optimal quit behaviour by workers:
any employee with tenure ￿ at a ￿rm o⁄ering contract ￿(￿) leaves at rate ￿ + ￿ +
￿[1 ￿ F(U(￿j￿))]: Thus at the time of hiring, the probability the new hire will still
be employed at the ￿rm after any given tenure ￿ is




5Note, equilibrium will ￿nd U(￿j￿) > 0(< 0) when ￿ < 1(> 1) so that payo⁄s are always
increasing in productivity y:
8Firms
Let ue denote the steady state unemployment rate and let N(x) denote the fraction
of unemployed workers who have experience no greater than x: Measure 1 ￿ ue of
workers are thus employed. Let H(x;U) denote the proportion of employed workers
who have experience no greater than x and piece rate value no greater than U: Below
we determine each of these objects (in a steady state equilibrium) but for now take
them as given.
Consider a ￿rm which posts contract ￿(:) with starting piece rate value U0 =
U(0j￿): If U0 < UU all potential employees prefer unemployment to accepting this
job o⁄er and so such an o⁄er yields zero pro￿t. Suppose instead U0 ￿ UU - such
o⁄ers are accepted at least by unemployed workers. As there is no discounting, the
























The ￿rm￿ s steady state ￿ ow pro￿t is composed of two terms. The ￿rst term describes
the hiring in￿ ow of unemployed workers by experience x (with corresponding initial
productivity y = y0 exp(￿x)) times the expected pro￿t obtained by employing such a
worker. The second term describes the hiring in￿ ow of currently employed workers
by experience x and (outside) value U0 (where a worker on piece rate value U0 will


















Note the ￿rst bracketed term depends only on U0 (given ue;N;H):
To determine the contract that maximizes ￿ we use the following two step proce-
dure. First we identify a ￿rm￿ s piece rate contract which maximizes
Z 1
0
 (tj￿(:))[1 ￿ ￿(t)]e
￿tdt
9conditional on the contract yielding piece rate value U0: Such a contract is termed an
optimal contract and is denoted ￿





























The ￿rm￿ s optimization problem then reduces to choosing a starting payo⁄ U0 to
maximize ￿￿(U0): Before formally de￿ning an equilibrium, it is convenient ￿rst to
characterise the set of optimal contracts ￿
￿ for any given distribution functions F;N
and H:
3 Optimal Piece Rate Tenure Contracts.
In this Section we extend the arguments used in Burdett and Coles (2003) to a more
general setting. A useful preliminary insight is that as the arrival rate of o⁄ers is
independent of a worker￿ s employment status, an unemployed worker will always
accept a contract which o⁄ers ￿(￿) = b for all t: Further, as b < 1 by assumption, a
￿rm can always obtain strictly positive pro￿t by o⁄ering this contract. Thus, without
loss of generality, we make the following restrictions: all ￿rms make strictly positive
pro￿t; i.e., ￿￿ > 0; and U ￿ UU; i.e., all ￿rms make acceptable o⁄ers. To simplify
the exposition further, however, we also assume F has a connected support.
For any starting value U0 ￿ UU; an optimal contract ￿






￿t[1 ￿ ￿(t)]dt (4)
subject to (a) ￿(:) ￿ 0; (b) U(0j￿(:)) = U0 and (c) the optimal quit strategies of work-
ers which determine the survival probability  (:j￿). As ￿ > 0 implies the marginal
utility of consumption is in￿nite at ￿ = 0; we will show an optimal contract always
implies ￿ > 0 for all t > 0:
10Given an optimal contract ￿
￿ which yields starting value U0; let U￿ ￿ U(￿j￿
￿)
denote the worker￿ s piece rate value of employment at tenure ￿ and note we can
describe U￿ as U￿(￿jU0): Similarly given an optimal contract ￿
￿ which yields starting










Theorem 1. For any U0 ￿ U; an optimal contract ￿
￿(:jU0) and corresponding worker
and ￿rm payo⁄s U￿ and ￿￿ are solutions to the dynamical system f￿;U;￿g where





￿￿ [1 ￿ ￿ + [￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ F(U))]￿] (5)












t [￿+￿￿￿+￿(1￿F(U(￿))]d￿(1 ￿ ￿(s))ds; and (6)







with initial value U(0) = U0:
The above characterization of an optimal contract is very general - it allows for
mass points in F and the density of F need not exist. In the equilibrium described
in Theorem 3 below, however, the density of o⁄ers F 0 exists. In that case, a more
intuitive structure arises if we totally di⁄erentiate (5) and (6) with respect to t and









0(U)￿ ￿ ￿￿ (8)
￿






11(8) describes how piece rates change along the optimal piece rate contract. If workers
are risk neutral (￿ = 0); as in Stevens (2004), the optimal contract is to pay ￿ = 0 for a
￿nite spell ￿ < T, after which the worker is paid marginal product, ￿ = 1. The reason
is that an employee who is paid less than marginal product is likely to be poached
by a better paying competitor. When the worker is risk neutral, the ￿rm extracts
the search rents of new hires as quickly as possible by paying the ￿ oor wage w = 0:
When instead workers are strictly risk averse (￿ > 0); workers prefer a smoother
consumption pro￿le. The optimal contract then involves a trade-o⁄ between lower
wage variation (smoother consumption) and reducing worker quit incentives.
The wage received within the employment spell is ￿(￿)e￿￿ [y0e￿x0]; where x0 de-
scribes the worker￿ s prior experience when hired by the ￿rm. Thus (8) implies the








Wages are thus always increasing within an employment spell, and strictly increasing
when the density of competing outside o⁄ers is positive (i.e., F 0(U) > 0): The optimal
contract reveals the underlying trade-o⁄between lower wage variation (smoother con-
sumption) and reducing the marginal quit incentives of employees: F 0(U) describes
the marginal number of competing ￿rms who might attract employee on value U; and
￿ describes the ￿rm￿ s corresponding loss in pro￿t should this employee quit. Note
further that a constant wage (perfect consumption smoothing) requires a piece rate
￿(￿) which declines at rate ￿: Thus even though an optimal contract implies wages
must always increase within an employment spell, tenure e⁄ects may now be negative
(but not so large that wages paid decline).
Assuming F 0 exists, the optimal piece rate contract is the saddle path solution
to the di⁄erential equation system (8)-(10). Let (￿
1;￿1;U1) denote the stationary















￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F(U1))
: (13)
12There are two types of optimal contracts; those whose piece rate value converges to
U1 from above and those whose value converge to U1 from below. Figure 1 depicts
the corresponding contracts ￿
￿(:) in tenure space.
Consider ￿rst the optimal contract for the ￿rm o⁄ering the least generous contract,
i.e., U0 = U: Further, assume U < U1: As shown in Figure 1, optimal ￿(:) ￿ ￿
s1(:)
increases with tenure and converges to the limit value ￿
1: As piece rates increase
with tenure, it follows U ￿ Us1 increases with tenure (and converges to U1) (while
continuation pro￿t ￿ decreases with tenure and converges to ￿1). Consider now
the optimal contract o⁄ered by ￿rms o⁄ering the most generous contract , i.e., U0 =
U: Further, assume U > U1: Although the wage paid increases with tenure, the
corresponding piece rate ￿(:) ￿ ￿
s2(:) decreases with tenure and converges to ￿
1
from above: This is also illustrated in Figure 1. The two optimal contracts, ￿
s1(:)
and ￿
s2(:); de￿ned above will be termed the lower and upper baseline piece rate scales
respectively.
13Figure 1: Baseline Piece Rate Scales
Consider now a ￿rm that o⁄ers a contract which yields an initial piece rate value
U0 such that U < U0 < U1: As depicted in Figure 1, de￿ne t0 as the point on the
lower baseline contract where Us1(t0) = U0: Optimality of the lower baseline piece
rate scale now yields a major simpli￿cation: the optimal contract yielding this U0 is
simply the continuation contract starting at point t0 on the lower baseline piece rate
14scale;i:e:; the optimal contract ￿
￿(￿jU0) is ￿
s1(t0 + ￿) where the piece rate paid at
tenure ￿ corresponds to point (t0+￿) on the lower baseline piece rate scale. Suppose
instead U > U0 > U1: This time the optimal contract yielding U0 is the continuation
contract starting at point t0 on the upper baseline piece rate scale where Us2(t0) = U0:
Thus for any U0 2 [U;U1], the optimal contract can be described by ￿
s1(:) and a
starting time t0 ￿ 0: Further for U0 2 [U1;U], the optimal contract can be described
by ￿
s2(:) and a starting time t0 ￿ 0: Hence, the distribution of optimal contracts
with U0 2 [U;U] can be described by (￿
s1(:);￿1(:);￿
s2(:);￿2(:)) where ￿i is the
distribution of starting times associated with ￿
si(:):
Of course it may happen that U = U1 in which case only the lower baseline scale
exists. In fact we shall show this is a consequence of a Market Equilibrium which we
now de￿ne.
4 MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Above we have shown for any U0 2 [U;U] an optimal contract corresponds to a saddle
path solution to the di⁄erential equation system (8)-(10). In what follows, however,
equation (5) in Theorem 1 is much more useful as it describes the solution to the
di⁄erential equation (8).
For any starting value U0 2 [U;U]; the optimal contract corresponds to a starting
point t0 on one of the piece rate scales where Usi(t0) = U0; with corresponding
maximized pro￿t ￿si(t0) and piece rate paid ￿
si(t0): By substituting out t0; we can
thus de￿ne ￿ = b ￿(U0) as the piece rate paid when the worker enjoys U0 on the
baseline piece rate scales, and ￿ = b ￿(U0) as the ￿rm￿ s continuation pro￿t. Using the
conditions of Theorem 1, Claim 1 identi￿es b ￿(U) and b ￿(U).
15Claim 1











1 ￿b ￿ + [￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ F(U))]b ￿
i
(15)





Proof: This follows directly from Theorem 1 and the de￿nitions of b ￿ and b ￿.
By construction, each ￿rm￿ s optimized steady state ￿ ow pro￿t by o⁄ering U0 2
[U;U] is
￿












We now formally de￿ne a Market Equilibrium.
A Market Equilibrium is a distribution of optimal contract o⁄ers, with corre-
sponding value distribution F(U); such that optimal job search by workers and steady
state turnover implies the constant pro￿t condition:
￿￿(U0) = ￿ > 0 if dF(U0) > 0;
￿￿(U0) ￿ ￿;otherwise,
(17)
The constant pro￿t condition requires that all optimal contracts U0 which are o⁄ered
by ￿rms in an equilibrium must make the same pro￿t ￿ > 0, and all other contracts
must make no greater pro￿t. Below for any distribution of contract o⁄ers F; we ￿rst
use steady state turnover arguments to determine the equilibrium unemployment
rate ue and distribution functions N and H: Identifying a Market Equilibrium then
requires ￿nding F(:) so that the above constant pro￿t condition is satis￿ed. We
perform this task using a series of lemmas. Lemma 1 describes a standard result.
16Lemma 1. A Market Equilibrium implies:
(a) U = Uu;
(b) ue = (￿ + ￿)=(￿ + ￿ + ￿):
Part (a) establishes that the lowest value o⁄er U extracts all search rents from
the unemployed. Part (b) identi￿es the steady state unemployment rate given all
unemployed workers accept their ￿rst job o⁄er.
With Lemma 1 in hand, we can now characterize steady state N(x) and H(x;U):
As all unemployed workers accept the ￿rst job o⁄er received, and employed workers
never quit into unemployment, obtaining the steady state distribution of experience
across unemployed workers is straightforward. Standard turnover arguments establish
N(x) = 1 ￿
￿￿





Let N0 = N(0) which describes the proportion of unemployed workers who have
never had a job and so have zero experience. (18) implies N0 > 0: For x > 0; the
distribution of experience across unemployed worker is described by the exponential
distribution.
Standard turnover arguments also establish that the distribution of experience
across all employed workers is




In contrast to N; note that H(0;U) = 0 : in a steady state the measure of employed
workers with zero experience must be zero. Lemma 2 now characterizes H(:) for all
x > 0; U 2 [U;U]:
Lemma 2. For x > 0 and U 2 [U;U]; H = H(x;U) satis￿es the partial di⁄erential
equation:








= (￿ + ￿)F(U)N(x);




U(U) is given by:
￿
U = b ￿
￿￿
[(1 ￿b ￿) ￿ [￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F(U))]b ￿] (20)
17and H satis￿es the boundary conditions
H(0;U) = 0 for all U 2 [U;U];
H(x;U) = 0 for all x ￿ 0:
Although H is described by a relatively straightforward ￿rst order partial di⁄erential
equation, a closed form solution does not exist. Nevertheless it is still possible to
characterize fully a Market Equilibrium.
Substituting out ue (obtained in Lemma 1) and N(x) (given by (18)) in (16),




￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)
+
￿















for all U0 2 [U;U]; with H given by Lemma 2. By solving for the last term in the
square bracket above, the proof of Theorem 2 shows the constant pro￿t condition
reduces to the following simple condition.




￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿
q
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿b ￿) for all U0 2 [U;U]; (22)
where ￿ = b ￿(U) is the highest piece rate o⁄ered in the market.
Putting ￿ = 0 ￿nds this solution is the same as that found in Burdett and Coles
(2003). Here of course, the Market Equilibrium depends on the rate of learning-by-
doing.
5 Existence and Characterization of a Market Equi-
librium.
The approach to solving for a Market Equilibrium is to hypothesize an equilibrium
value for ￿ and then use backward induction to map out the equilibrium outcomes.
18The free choice of ￿ is then tied down by the requirement UU = U (Lemma 1a).
Conditional on an equilibrium value for ￿; Lemma 3 now determines the cor-
responding equilibrium support of o⁄ers [U;U] and ￿nds the (unique) closed form
solution for equilibrium b ￿(:):
Lemma 3. For any equilibrium value ￿ 2 (0;1); a Market Equilibrium implies b ￿(:)
is given by the implicit function
q
(1 ￿ ￿)








0 = [U ￿ U] (23)
for all U 2 [U;U] where U;U satisfy
[￿]1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
= [￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]U + ￿[U ￿ U] (24)
(1 ￿ ￿) =
￿
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿
￿2
(1 ￿ ￿) (25)
and ￿ ￿ b ￿(U) is the lowest piece rate paid in the market; i.e.,
q
(1 ￿ ￿)








0 = U ￿ U:
Lemma 3 establishes the following important corollary.
Corollary: A Market Equilibrium implies U = U1:
The higher baseline piece rate scale in Figure 1 implied piece rates paid might
(optimally) fall with tenure. A Market Equilibrium, however, rules out this possi-




= 2(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿)￿
￿









￿ F 0(U)￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿
￿￿
[1 ￿ ￿ ￿ [￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿]￿]
19at U = U: As Theorem 2 implies ￿ = b ￿(U) = (1 ￿ ￿)=(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿); the denominator
in the above equation is therefore zero. Hence ￿niteness requires the numerator must
also be zero; i.e. ￿￿
1￿￿
F 0(U)￿=￿ = ￿￿: This immediately implies d￿=dt = dU=dt =
d￿=dt = 0 at U and so U = U1:
It is now straightforward to establish existence of a Market Equilibrium. Note











;1); it is trivial to show a solution to
the equations in Lemma 3 for b ￿; U;U always exists, is unique, is continuous in ￿
and implies 0 < ￿ < ￿ and U < U: Note that Theorem 2 then uniquely determines



















= [￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]U ￿ ￿U ￿ ￿S (26)
for all U 2 [U;U] with initial value S(U) = 0: Using the solutions above for b ￿; b ￿;and
U; and noting Theorem 2 implies b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿) > 0, this initial value
problem uniquely determines S; and thus F(U): The ￿nal step, then, is to note a
Market Equilibrium must also satisfy UU = U where UU is given by (2). This
identi￿es a ￿xed point problem which ties down the equilibrium value of ￿:
Theorem 3. [Existence and Characterization]. For ￿ > 0; a Market Equilibrium
exists characterised by a ￿ 2 (1 ￿ [
￿+￿￿￿
￿+￿￿￿+￿]2;1) with
(A) the support of o⁄ers [U;U] (and corresponding ￿) given by (24)-(25), where over
that support,
(B) b ￿(:) is given by (23), b ￿(:) is given by (22), S(:) is the solution to the initial value
problem (26) with S(U) = 0;
(C) UU is given by (2) and satis￿es UU = U.
206 Empirical Implications and Conclusion
The analysis generalizes straightforwardly to the case that workers are heterogenous.
In particular note that the equilibrium characterization in Theorem 3 does not depend
on y0: Assume instead then that each new entrant has productivity y0 drawn from
some population distribution A: Theorem 3 continues to describe the Market Equi-
librium: all workers continue to use the same turnover strategies, the unemployment
rate and distribution of experience is the same for each type y0, and the equilibrium
set of optimal piece rate contracts is unchanged. The only di⁄erence is that steady
state ￿ ow pro￿t is now
￿



















for all U0 2 [U;U]: By de￿ning ￿ =
R y
y y0dA(y0); all the previous arguments go
through but with y0 now replaced by ￿:
Although a trivial theoretical extension, the extension to worker heterogeneity
is clearly crucial for empirical work. If yi denotes the initial productivity of worker
i; then a Market Equilibrium implies the wage earned by this worker after x years
experience, with tenure ￿ at ￿rm j o⁄ering contract ￿j(:) is:




The observed wage thus depends on the worker ￿xed e⁄ect logyi, the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect
log￿j(0) (which describes ￿rm j0s starting piece rate paid to new hires), experience
e⁄ect x and the tenure e⁄ect at ￿rm j: Of course a Market Equilibrium not only iden-
ti￿es the distribution of starting piece rates ￿j(0) across all ￿rms j, it also determines
the within-￿rm tenure e⁄ects ￿j(￿)=￿j(0):
In contrast Altonji and Williams (2005) points out that, in the applied literature,
the standard wage regression equation is of the form
logwij(x;￿) = ￿x + ￿2￿ + "ijt
21where ￿2 measures the return to tenure and the error term
"ijt = yi + ￿ij + uit + ￿ijt
contains both a worker ￿xed e⁄ect yi and a random match payo⁄￿ij between worker
i and ￿rm j: The remaining error terms suppose these key residuals might vary
randomly over time.
A key di⁄erence between these two approaches is that the wage equation (28)
contains a ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect, log￿j(0): This ￿xed e⁄ect is central to our explanation
of quit turnover: a quit occurs whenever an employee at ￿rm j on piece rate ￿j(￿)
receives an outside o⁄er from a di⁄erent ￿rm k which o⁄ers starting piece rate ￿k(0) >
￿j(￿):
The standard empirical approach instead assumes there is unobserved match het-
erogeneity. The di¢ culty then is that with endogenous quit turnover, the unobserved
match value is positively correlated with experience and tenure: the former as workers
with long experience have had more time to ￿nd a good match, the latter as matches
with high value are likely to survive to long tenures. Controlling for this endogene-
ity problem is clearly problematic (see for example the classic papers Topel (1991),
Altonji and Shakotko (1991) and more recently Dustmann and Meghir (2005) which
identi￿es the return to experience by instead focussing on workers laid-o⁄ through
plant closure).
An additional empirical issue is that the estimated return to tenure, ￿2 above; is
assumed to be ￿rm-independent. The theory here not only shows this is unlikely but
numerical examples ￿nd the (￿rm speci￿c) tenure e⁄ect on wages is always negatively
correlated with the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect; i.e. tenure e⁄ects are larger at low wages. Or in
other words, the (lower) baseline piece rate scale is concave (as drawn in Figure 1).
There seem to be two principal reasons for this. First, note that optimal contract-







within an employment spell. Firms which o⁄er a lower starting piece rate enjoy a
higher expected pro￿t per new hire ￿ (but in equilibrium attract fewer hires). (29)
22implies greater pro￿t ￿ implies wages rise more quickly with tenure: the ￿rm has a
greater incentive not to lose the worker to an outside o⁄er. Second, numerical work
always ￿nds that the equilibrium job o⁄er distribution is tightly bunched at the lower
end of the distribution. Indeed there is always a mass of ￿rms which o⁄er U = U:
Strong competition for workers at the bottom end of the wage distribution again
leads ￿rms to raise wages relatively quickly with tenure. Of course when the worker￿ s
earned piece rate is close to the top end of the distribution, and so the worker is
unlikely to receive a more favourable outside o⁄er, there is little incentive for the ￿rm
to keep raising its piece rate paid.
The approach taken here also yields a theory of cross section wage dispersion
which is consistent with the distribution of wage/age pro￿les across individual work-
ers. Speci￿cally the model has an overlapping generation structure - where di⁄erent
individuals enter the labour market at di⁄erent dates - and heterogeneous outcomes
where an individual￿ s wage depends not only on accumulated experience but also on
luck in ￿nding well paid employment. Equilibrium turnover implies interesting sort-
ing e⁄ects: higher wage ￿rms not only attract and retain more workers, but also, in
steady state, enjoy a more experienced and thus more productive workforce (see Bur-
dett et al (2010)). Of course these sorting e⁄ects have a direct impact on equilibrium
contract competition. Such sorting also signi￿cantly increases wage inequality: young
workers not only have little work experience, they also typically earn low piece rates
as starting o⁄ers are rarely generous and internal promotion takes time. Indeed reser-
vation piece rate (values) of the unemployed are particularly low as (i) experience is
valuable and an employee can still search for better paid employment while employed,
and (ii) expectations of promotion within a ￿rm generates a ￿foot-in-the-door￿e⁄ect
as described in Burdett and Coles (2003).
It should also be noted that the transition functions from job to job and between
unemployment and employment can be easily obtained in equilibrium. Most of these
are constant through time. The quit ￿ ow from one job to another job, however,
decreases with tenure; i.e. at any given ￿rm, there is negative duration dependence
in its employees￿job-to-job hazard rate. This testable prediction distinguishes our
23approach from the one taken by Bagger et al (2010). In that framework a worker
always quits whenever he/she contacts a more productive ￿rm; i.e. at any given ￿rm,
its employees￿job-to-job hazard rate is duration independent.
Finally we comment on our restriction that the piece rate contract ￿(￿) is not con-
ditioned on prior experience x0; i.e. what happens if we allow more general contracts
￿ = ￿(:jx0)? First note that equation (29), which describes how wages evolve within
the employment spell, will continue to hold: it describes the optimal (local) trade-o⁄
between smoother wages and reduced quit incentives. The fundamental di⁄erence is
that if contract o⁄ers discriminate by prior experience then the distribution of out-
side o⁄ers is described by F(Ujx0): Clearly this extension signi￿cantly complicates
any equilibrium analysis: it then needs to characterise a continuum of outside o⁄er
distributions. Such an extension, however, would have two clear implications. First
it implies workers with the same productivity but di⁄erent prior experience are of-
fered di⁄erent contracts. Such discrimination is potentially illegal - it allows ￿rms to
discriminate against, say, highly talented women who return to the workplace after a
spell of child-rearing. Second the wage equation must be extended as
logwij(x;￿jx0) = logyi + log￿j(0jx0) + ￿x + log
￿j(￿jx0)
￿j(0jx0)
where x0 describes the worker￿ s prior experience at the point of hire. But this equation
can be rearranged as








where the second term describes the prior experience e⁄ect and the last term describes
the tenure e⁄ect (interacted with prior experience). Clearly identifying the return to
experience ￿ becomes more problematic with such discrimination.
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where (1) and (3) in the text imply:
:
￿ = [￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ F(U))]￿ (30)
:








[1 ￿ F(U0)]dU0 (31)
and with starting values
￿(0) = 1;U(0) = U0:
De￿ne the Hamiltonian
H = ￿[1 ￿ ￿] + ￿￿[￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ F(U))]￿
+￿U
"











where ￿￿;￿U denote the costate variables associated with the state variables ￿;U:
Whenever the corner constraint ￿ ￿ 0 is not binding, the Maximum Principle implies
the necessary conditions for a maximum are:
@H
@￿
= ￿￿ ￿ ￿U￿




= ￿[1 ￿ ￿(t)] ￿ ￿￿[￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ F(U))]: (33)
The standard approach also identi￿es a di⁄erential equation for ￿U but we cannot
use that approach as we do not assume F is di⁄erentiable. Instead no discounting
implies the additional constraint
H = 0









t [￿+￿￿￿+￿(1￿F(U(￿))]d￿(1 ￿ ￿(s))ds + A0e
R t
0[￿+￿+￿(1￿F(V (x)))￿￿]dx
= ￿(t) + A0e
R t
0[￿+￿+￿(1￿F(V (x)))￿￿]dx
where A0 is the constant of integration and ￿(:) is the ￿rm￿ s continuation pro￿t as
de￿ned in the Theorem. As (32) implies ￿U = ￿￿￿
￿; then substituting out ￿U and
￿￿ in the de￿nition of H; the restriction H=0 yields the optimality condition:





















Now the restriction ￿ > ￿ ensures exp[
R t
0[￿ + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F(U(￿))) ￿ ￿]d￿] grows
exponentially as t ! 1: As ￿ and U must be bounded (otherwise an employee or
￿rm must be willing to make unboundedly large losses) then (34) implies A0 = 0:
(34) now yields (5) given in the Theorem. Using this to substitute out ￿1￿￿
1￿￿ in (31)
then yields (7).
Finally note (5) determines ￿: As ￿ ! 0; ￿ > 0 guarantees the left hand side of
(5) becomes unboundedly large. As the right hand side of (5) is bounded it follows
that ￿ > 0 implies ￿ ￿ 0 is never a binding constraint: This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Lemma 1(a) follows from standard contradiction arguments. U < Uu is inconsistent
with strictly positive pro￿t (￿rms o⁄ering starting value U0 < Uu make zero pro￿t),
while U > Uu is inconsistent with the constant pro￿t condition (o⁄ering U0 = U
is dominated by o⁄ering U0 = UU as both o⁄ers only attract the unemployed and
o⁄ering Uu < U generates greater pro￿t per hire). Lemma 1(b) then follows from
standard turnover arguments.
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider the pool of employed workers who have experience
no greater than x > 0 and piece rate value no greater than U: Then for U < U1; the
28total out￿ ow of workers from this pool, over any instant of time dt > 0; is





















where the ￿rst term is the number who die, lose their job or quit through receiving
a job o⁄er with value greater than U; the second is the number who exit through
achieving greater experience, while the third is the number who exit through internal
promotion, where Us(t) = U: The in￿ ow is ￿ueF(U)N(x)dt which is the number of
unemployed workers with experience no greater than x who receive a job o⁄er with
value no greater than U: Setting in￿ ow equal to out￿ ow, using the solution for ue in
lemma 1 and letting dt ! 0 implies H satis￿es:















0 = (￿ + ￿)F(U)N(x):
Integrating thus yields

















= (￿ + ￿)F(U)N(x):




@U = 0 which with the above
equation yields the stated solution. This argument but for U > U1 establishes the
same di⁄erential equation. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.










with H(.) as described by Lemma 2.































as Hx(x0;U) = 0: Thus (21) implies
b ￿(U0)
￿
￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)
+
￿



































5 = 0 for all U0 2 [U;U]: (36)
Consider now the integral in the second line. For x > 0; partial di⁄erentiation with





= (￿ + ￿)FN
0(x) ￿
￿
















































￿￿￿ (￿ + ￿ + ￿)F
(￿ + ￿)[￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)]
















































30Putting x = 0 in the pde for H (see Lemma 2) implies
@H(0;U)
@x
= (￿ + ￿)N0F(U):
Now as x0 ! 1; the conditional distribution of employee payo⁄s H(Ujx0) converges
to its ergodic distribution H(Uj1). As the distribution of experience is exponential
with parameter ￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)=(￿ + ￿) [see equation (19) in the text] then ￿ > ￿






















0 ￿ (￿ + ￿)N0F








￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)
￿ + ￿
F
by de￿nition of N0 and (18). Inserting this solution into (37) yields an equation for
R
x0>0 e￿x0 @2H(x0;U0)




(36) then yields a closed form solution for
R
x0>0 e￿x0 @H(x0;U0)








[￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)]￿
￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿)[￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿]￿y0
(1 ￿b ￿) for all U0 2 [U;U]:
Finally we substitute out ￿ in this expression. Putting U0 = U in (35), letting
￿ ￿ b ￿(U); substituting out H(x;U) using (19) and some algebra establishes
￿
￿
￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿)










(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿b ￿) for all U0 2 [U;U]:
Setting U0 = U implies
￿ =
1 ￿ ￿
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿
; (39)
31and combining the last two expressions yields the Theorem. This completes the proof
of Theorem 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using Theorem 2 to compute db ￿=dU and using (14) in Claim
1 implies b ￿(:) satis￿es
￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿￿
2￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿)[￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿]
q





with b ￿ = ￿ at U = U: Integrating implies (23). Putting U = U in (15) and using
(39) in the Appendix implies (24). Noting @H(x;U)=@x = 0; then putting U = U in
(35) and using (38), (39) and Theorem 2 yields (25). Finally putting U = U in (23)
implies (24). This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Theorem 3: By construction these are necessary conditions for a Market
Equilibrium. Given any such solution, then by construction all optimal contracts
which o⁄er U0 2 [U;U] yield the same steady state ￿ ow pro￿t. Consider now any
deviating contract. Clearly, a suboptimal contract which o⁄ers U0 2 [U;U] yields
lower pro￿t. Further any contract which o⁄ers value U0 < U yields zero pro￿t as
UU = U and all workers reject such an o⁄er. Finally any contract which o⁄ers
U0 > U attracts no more workers than an optimal contract which o⁄ers U while
the latter contract earns strictly greater pro￿t per hire.6 As no deviating contracts
exist which yield greater pro￿t, a solution to the above conditions identi￿es a Market
Equilibrium.
We now establish existence of a solution when ￿ > 0. Given an arbitrary value





;1); let e F(:j￿) denote the solution for F implied by solving








[1 ￿ e F(:j￿)]dU0; (40)
i.e. e UU(￿) is the optimal reservation piece rate UU of unemployed workers given o⁄er






such that e UU(￿) = U(￿):
6Note the arguments in Burdett and Coles (2003) rule out a mass point in H at U = U:
32First note that as ￿ ! 1; (25) implies ￿! 1: As all piece rates ￿ paid must then lie
in an arbitrarily small neighborhood around one, frictions (￿ < 1) and b < 1 imply
e UU < U: Instead consider the limit ￿ ! ￿(￿ + 2[￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿])=(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿)2 which,
by (25), implies ￿! 0: ￿ ￿ 1 implies the ￿ ow payo⁄ by accepting the lowest ￿ o⁄er,
￿1￿￿=(1￿￿); becomes unboundedly negative in this limit. As b ￿(:) is continuous and is
less than ￿, this implies U! ￿1 in this limit. But (40) implies ￿e UU > b1￿￿
1￿￿ and thus
e UU > U in this limit. As the solutions for b ￿(:); b ￿(:);S(:) and U are all continuous





;1) exists where e UU = U and so
identi￿es a Market Equilibrium. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
33CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3140 Lawrence M. Kahn, Labor Market Policy: A Comparative View on the Costs and 
Benefits of Labor Market Flexibility, July 2010 
 
3141 Ben J. Heijdra, Jochen O. Mierau and Laurie S.M. Reijnders, The Tragedy of 
Annuitization, July 2010 
 
3142 Erkki Koskela, Outsourcing Cost and Tax Progression under Nash Wage Bargaining 
with Flexible Outsourcing, July 2010 
 
3143 Daniel Osberghaus and Christiane Reif, Total Costs and Budgetary Effects of 
Adaptation to Climate Change: An Assessment for the European Union, August 2010 
 
3144 Philip E. Graves, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Environmental Projects: A Plethora of 
Systematic Biases, August 2010 
 
3145 Sabrina Di Addario and Daniela Vuri, Entrepreneurship and Market Size. The Case of 
Young College Graduates in Italy, August 2010 
 
3146 Shoshana Amyra Grossbard and Alfredo Marvăo Pereira, Will Women Save more than 
Men? A Theoretical Model of Savings and Marriage, August 2010 
 
3147 Jarko Fidrmuc, Time-Varying Exchange Rate Basket in China from 2005 to 2009, 
August 2010 
 
3148 Ilja Neustadt and Peter Zweifel, Is the Welfare State Sustainable? Experimental 
Evidence on Citizens’ Preferences for Redistribution, August 2010 
 
3149 Marcus Dittrich and Andreas Knabe, Wage and Employment Effects of Non-Binding 
Minimum Wages, August 2010 
 
3150 Shutao Cao, Enchuan Shao and Pedro Silos, Fixed-Term and Permanent Employment 
Contracts: Theory and Evidence, August 2010 
 
3151 Ludger Woessmann, Cross-Country Evidence on Teacher Performance Pay, August 
2010 
 
3152 Lorenzo C. G. Pozzi, Casper G. de Vries and Jorn Zenhorst, World Equity Premium 
Based Risk Aversion Estimates, August 2010 
 
3153 Volker Grossmann, Thomas M. Steger and Timo Trimborn, Dynamically Optimal R&D 
Subsidization, August 2010 
 
3154 Alexander Haupt, Tim Krieger and Thomas Lange, A Note on Brain Gain and Brain 
Drain: Permanent Migration and Education Policy, August 2010 
  
3155 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Long-run Determinants of Sovereign Yields, 
August 2010 
 
3156 Franziska Tausch, Jan Potters and Arno Riedl, Preferences for Redistribution and 
Pensions. What can we Learn from Experiments?, August 2010 
 
3157 Martin Kolmar and Andreas Wagener, Inefficient Group Organization as Optimal 
Adaption to Dominant Environments, August 2010 
 
3158 Kai Carstensen, Klaus Wohlrabe and Christina Ziegler, Predictive Ability of Business 
Cycle Indicators under Test: A Case Study for the Euro Area Industrial Production, 
August 2010 
 
3159 Horst Rottmann and Timo Wollmershäuser, A Micro Data Approach to the 
Identification of Credit Crunches, August 2010 
 
3160 Philip E. Graves, Appropriate Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle: Proper Stimulus 
Policies Can Work, August 2010 
 
3161 Michael Binder and Marcel Bluhm, On the Conditional Effects of IMF Program 
Participation on Output Growth, August 2010 
 
3162 Michael Binder, Qianying Chen, and Xuan Zhang, On the Effects of Monetary Policy 
Shocks on Exchange Rates, August 2010 
 
3163 Felix J. Bierbrauer, On the Optimality of Optimal Income Taxation, August 2010 
 
3164 Nikolaus Wolf, Europe’s Great Depression – Coordination Failure after the First World 
War, September 2010 
 
3165 Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields, September 
2010 
 
3166 Jean-Pierre Ponssard and Catherine Thomas, Capacity Investment under Demand 
Uncertainty. An Empirical Study of the US Cement Industry, 1994-2006, September 
2010 
 
3167 Jørgen Juel Andersen, Jon H. Fiva and Gisle James Natvik, Voting when the Stakes are 
High, September 2010 
 
3168 Michael Hoel, Is there a Green Paradox?, September 2010 
 
3169 Scott Alan Carson, Nineteenth Century US African-American and White Female 
Statures: Insight from US Prison Records, September 2010 
 
3170 Gil S. Epstein, Yosef Mealem and Shmuel Nitzan, Political Culture and Discrimination 
in Contests, September 2010 
 
3171 Sara Fisher Ellison, Jeffrey Greenbaum and Wallace P. Mullin, Diversity, Social Goods 
Provision, and Performance in the Firm, September 2010  
3172 Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, Randolph Sloof and Ferdinand von Siemens, Monitoring 
your Friends, not your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority, 
September 2010 
 
3173 Marcus Dittrich and Beate Schirwitz, Union Membership and Employment Dynamics: 
A Note, September 2010 
 
3174 Francesco Daveri, Paolo Manasse and Danila Serra, The Twin Effects of Globalization 
– Evidence from a Sample of Indian Manufacturing Firms, September 2010 
 
3175 Florian Blöchl, Fabian J. Theis, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Eric O’N. Fisher, Which 
Sectors of a Modern Economy are most Central?, September 2010 
 
3176 Dag Morten Dalen, Marilena Locatelli and Steinar Strøm, Longitudinal Analysis of 
Generic Substitution, September 2010 
 
3177 Armin Falk, Stephan Meier and Christian Zehnder, Did we Overestimate the Role of 
Social Preferences? The Case of Self-Selected Student Samples, September 2010 
 
3178 Christian Fahrholz and Cezary Wójcik, The Bail-Out! Positive Political Economics of 
Greek-type Crises in the EMU, September 2010 
 
3179 Klaus Abberger and Wolfgang Nierhaus, The Ifo Business Cycle Clock: Circular 
Correlation with the Real GDP, September 2010 
 
3180 Walter Krämer and Gerhard Arminger, “True Believers” or Numerical Terrorism at the 
Nuclear Power Plant, September 2010 
 
3181 Bernard M.S. Van Praag, Dmitri Romanov and Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Happiness and 
Financial Satisfaction in Israel. Effects of Religiosity, Ethnicity, and War, September 
2010 
 
3182 Dimitrios Koumparoulis and Paul De Grauwe, Public Capital, Employment and 
Productivity: An Empirical Investigation for Greece, September 2010 
 
3183 John Whalley and Tanmaya Shekhar, The Rapidly Deepening India-China Economic 
Relationship, September 2010 
 
3184 Andreas Schäfer and Thomas Steger, History, Expectations, and Public Policy: 
Economic Development in Eastern Germany, September 2010 
 
3185 Thomas Eichner and Marco Runkel, Subsidizing Renewable Energy under Capital 
Mobility, September 2010 
 
3186 Konstantinos Angelopoulos and James Malley, Fear of Model Misspecification and the 
Robustness Premium, September 2010 
 
3187 Philip E. Graves, A Note on the Design of Experiments Involving Public Goods, 
September 2010 
  
3188 Glenn Ellison, How does the Market Use Citation Data? The Hirsch Index in 
Economics, September 2010 
 
3189 Barbara Hanel and Regina T. Riphahn, The Employment of Mothers – Recent 
Developments and their Determinants in East and West Germany, September 2010 
 
3190 Alexander Haupt and Silke Uebelmesser, Integration, Mobility, and Human Capital 
Formation, September 2010 
 
3191 Vincenzo Galasso and Paola Profeta, When the State Mirrors the Family: The Design of 
Pension Systems, September 2010 
 
3192 Stéphane Zuber and Geir B. Asheim, Justifying Social Discounting: The Rank-
Discounted Utilitarian Approach, September 2010 
 
3193 Alexander Kemnitz, Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees, 
September 2010 
 
3194 Claudia M. Buch, Sandra Eickmeier and Esteban Prieto, Macroeconomic Factors and 
Micro-Level Bank Risk, September 2010 
 
3195 May Elsayyad and Kai A. Konrad, Fighting Multiple Tax Havens, September 2010 
 
3196 Laszlo Goerke and Markus Pannenberg, Trade Union Membership and Dismissals, 
September 2010 
 
3197 Ferdinand Mittermaier and Johannes Rincke, Do Countries Compensate Firms for 
International Wage Differentials?, September 2010 
 
3198 John Boyd, Gianni De Nicoló and Abu M. Jalal, Bank Competition, Asset Allocations 
and Risk of Failure: An Empirical Investigation, September 2010 
 
3199 Guido Heineck and Bernd Süssmuth, A Different Look at Lenin’s Legacy: Trust, Risk, 
Fairness and Cooperativeness in the two Germanies, September 2010 
 
3200 Ingvild Almås, Tarjei Havnes and Magne Mogstad, Baby Booming Inequality? 
Demographic Change and Earnings Inequality in Norway, 1967-2000, October 2010 
 
3201 Thomas Aronsson and Sören Blomquist, The Standard Deviation of Life-Length, 
Retirement Incentives, and Optimal Pension Design, October 2010 
 
3202 Thorvaldur Gylfason and Eduard Hochreiter, Growing Together: Croatia and Latvia, 
October 2010 
 
3203 Ken Burdett and Melvyn Coles, Tenure and Experience Effects on Wages: A Theory, 
October 2010 